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Saving Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment: A History of Sharia Law in the West and 
Suggestions to Save Similar State Legislation from Federal Constitutional Attack 
Steven M. Rosato
*
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In recent years, an increasing number of statehouses across the country have introduced 
bills and state constitutional amendments seeking to ban or limit the use of Sharia or 
international law in state court decisions.
1
  While the overwhelming majority of such bills have 
failed to achieve passage,
2
 Oklahoma succeeded in 2010 in passing a state constitutional 
amendment popularly known as the “Save Our State” Amendment (the “Amendment”), which 
sought to ban state courts from considering international law in general and Sharia Law in 
particular.
3
  The Amendment passed decisively by referendum on November 2, 2010, with voter 
approval over 70%.
4
  
Shortly thereafter, however, Muneer Awad (a Muslim resident of Oklahoma) challenged 
the Amendment in U.S. District Court on the grounds that it violated both the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and he obtained a preliminary 
injunction to prevent certification of the election result.
5
  The State appealed the District Court’s 
ruling to the Tenth Circuit, which subsequently affirmed the injunction, holding that the 
Amendment violated the Establishment Clause, but the court declined to reach the question of 
whether the Amendment also violated the Free Exercise Clause.
6
  While the Tenth Circuit’s 
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 2 
result may be correct in this particular case, it is important to understand the complex reasons 
why state legislatures across the United States continue to propose measures very similar to the 
“Save Our State” Amendment.  This perceived backlash against Sharia should not merely be 
dismissed as an “Islamophobic” reaction of close-minded individuals in the wake of 9/11; to do 
so would be to ignore real and ominous developments in Western countries with significant 
Muslim populations. 
Sharia is generally defined as “[t]he body of Islamic religious law applicable to police, 
banking, business, contracts, and social issues.”7  While this general definition introduces the 
very basic concept that Sharia seeks to govern a wide array of societal and economic 
interactions, it fails to capture the distinctions made among various Islamic countries and sects.
8
   
The nuances of Sharia will be developed more fully below, but the fact that there exist differing 
interpretations of Sharia is introduced here simply to emphasize that there is not a single, 
definitive interpretation of Sharia in the Muslim world. 
The thinking with regard to the proper application of Sharia to Muslim adherents in 
Islamic countries has developed along two separate tracks.
9
  On one track is the traditional 
conception of Sharia as a personal guide for believers; that is, the application of Sharia is 
“limited to religious observance by Muslims, and elements of family law.”10  This particular 
form of Sharia, which deals mostly with personal behavior, is purely voluntary among adherents 
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in Western countries.
11
  Moreover, the traditional conception of Sharia directs followers living in 
Western countries to “obey the laws and customs of the land to which they move, and to set a 
good example to their non-Muslim neighbors.”12  Indeed, prior to the rise of more radical forms 
of Sharia in the twentieth century, Islamic adherents in Western countries rarely challenged the 
validity of Western legal systems as applied to them.
13
  Thus, traditional Sharia generally has had 
no impact on Western legal systems, although some of its applications can conflict with the 
Western legal tradition in certain areas such as family law.
14
  For example, it is far more 
common in the sensitive area of family law for Muslims to “decline Western marriage, or be 
prevented by Western law . . . from turning to Western courts regarding divorce and 
inheritance.”15  This apparent clash notwithstanding, the traditional conception of Sharia does not 
typically conflict with the legal systems of Western countries because it does not advocate that 
adherents should flout the laws of the non-Muslim countries in which they reside.
16
 
On the other track is the Islamist conception of Sharia,
17
 which “holds that the West is an 
area of unbelief and that Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must 
establish their own Islamic legal standard.”18  Gaining more support in recent years among both 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Western countries is the idea—originated in Islamist circles—of 
“parallel Sharia,” which states that Muslims in non-Muslim countries should be permitted to 
operate a legal system in parallel with the secular legal system of the Western country in which 
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they reside.
19
  While some “Islamophobes” in Western countries claim that they will eventually 
be forced to adhere to Sharia, this worry seems misplaced and unwarranted.  Rather, the greater 
emphasis should be placed on the specter of a legal system that forces a particular religious 
group to adhere to the tenets of religious law with no possibility of intervention or adjudication 
by the secular courts.
20
  
The concept of “parallel Sharia” falls somewhere in between the traditional conception of 
Sharia, which holds that Muslims should obey the laws of non-Muslim countries while still 
adhering to the personal tenets of Islam, and the radical conception of Sharia, which holds that 
Muslims in non-Muslim countries should not feel compelled to obey the commands of the 
secular legal system.
21
  “Parallel Sharia” calls for the establishment of a separate legal system in 
non-Muslim countries based on the laws of the Muslim faith and enforced by the non-Muslim 
secular governments themselves.
22
  It must be noted, however, that a “parallel Sharia” system 
would not necessarily include those radical elements supported by some adherents of the Islamist 
conception.
23
  Notwithstanding that fact, there is always the danger that radical elements of 
Sharia could be introduced into such a system.
24
  Indeed, the idea of a parallel system of justice 
originated in radical circles.
25
  Various scholars, including some with radical beliefs, have 
euphemistically referred to “parallel Sharia” as “fiqh for minorities,” or “a body of opinion 
derived from Shariah doctrine to govern the lives of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim lands.”26 
These euphemisms seemingly serve to give off the appearance that the supporters of parallel 
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Sharia merely seek a “reasonable accommodation” of their religion, when in fact the true goal of 
“parallel Sharia” is to bring Muslim minorities under an entirely separate legal system 
administered by religious authorities and enforced by Western governments.
27
  
Many Western countries have already adopted a system of “reasonable accommodation” 
of differing religious views.
28
  In the United States, for example, employment regulations 
promulgated in accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically define “reasonable 
accommodation” and provide direction as to the manner in which employers falling within the 
purview of the Act should accommodate the religious views of their employees.
29
  “Reasonable 
accommodation” is certainly an idea ingrained in our constitutional system and is clearly in line 
with the First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]”30  The concept of a parallel 
system of justice for a religious minority, however, would seem to exceed that constitutional 
command and foster isolation and separation of the minority from the rest of society.
31
 
Sharia law has been introduced to varying degrees in some of the most influential 
countries in Europe, including Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Spain.
32
  
Great Britain in particular has seen a dramatic increase in Islamic radicalism in conjunction with 
louder calls for the establishment of “parallel Sharia” within its borders; in fact, the British 
government sanctioned the creation of approximately eighty Sharia courts.
33
  While all of these 
countries have relatively small Muslim populations—Britain’s Muslim population, for example, 
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accounts for approximately 4.8% of the total population, with several cities reporting double-
digit minority populations—there has been increasing focus on compliance with the tenets of 
Sharia in these countries, and statistics point to increasing radicalization of Muslim youth in 
Western countries such as Great Britain.
34
  
This Comment will examine both the constitutionality of state statutes or constitutional 
amendments that seek to ban the consideration of Sharia law in judicial decision-making, and 
potential alternative forms of legislation that might achieve the same goal of separation of church 
and state that state constitutional amendments like the “Save Our State” Amendment seek to 
achieve.  Part II of this Comment will provide background on Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” 
Amendment, along with an analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Awad v. Ziriax.  In order to 
further flesh out the Tenth Circuit’s analysis and frame the constitutional discussion of 
alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment to be offered in Part V, Part III will examine 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence in the context of both the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause, which set forth the parameters in which state legislation on religious issues 
must operate.  Next, Part IV will provide an in-depth background on Sharia law and its influence 
in various Western countries (specifically Great Britain), ultimately arguing that the increasing 
influence of Sharia law in Western countries and calls for parallel systems of Sharia have been 
driving forces behind the proposal of apparently anti-Sharia legislation in state legislatures across 
the United States. Returning to the “Save Our State” Amendment and similar state legislative 
initiatives, Part V will begin with a discussion of the principles of federalism and argue that 
states should be granted significant autonomy to craft rules of decision for their courts.  This Part 
will then go on to analyze various possible state statutes and constitutional amendments that seek 
                                                          
34
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to limit consideration of religious law in the secular courts and determine whether each 
alternative would pass constitutional muster under either Establishment Clause or Free Exercise 
Clause analysis.  Finally, Part VI will conclude by stating that regardless of one’s views on the 
advisability of state constitutional amendments or statutes seeking to ban consideration of 
religious doctrine in state court, so long as those amendments or statutes do not run afoul of the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, states should be free to craft rules of decision for their 
courts if they deem it to be of sufficient necessity to do so. 
II. Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment and an Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s 
Decision in Awad v. Ziriax 
 
A. The “Save Our State” Amendment 
The Oklahoma House of Representatives originally introduced the “Save Our State” 
Amendment as a House Joint Resolution on February 1, 2010.
35
  The stated purpose of the 
resolution was to “requir[e] the courts to uphold and adhere to federal and state law.”36  An 
Oklahoma House News Release provides a glimpse into the thinking of Oklahoma politicians as 
to the reasons why the Amendment was necessary. In the Release, Representative Rex Duncan 
said: 
Oklahomans should not have to worry that their rights could be undermined by 
foreign court rulings in countries that do not have our respect for individual 
liberty and justice for all.  Unfortunately, some judges in other states and on the 
federal bench have begun to cite international law in their court decisions, 
creating the need for this constitutional amendment.
37
 
 
Based on this quote, one could infer that Oklahoma politicians were largely concerned with the 
possibility that the state’s judges might attempt to rest their decisions on international law and 
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sought to prevent that from happening.  Both the Oklahoma House and Senate eventually passed 
the Joint Resolution almost unanimously on May 18, 2010, and May 24, 2010, respectively.
38
 
The relevant text of the Amendment, as adopted by the Oklahoma Legislature, is as 
follows: 
The Courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States 
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma 
Statutes and rules promulgated thereto, and if necessary the law of another of the 
United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in 
making judicial decisions.  The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures.  Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or 
Sharia Law.  The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the 
respective courts, including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
39
 
 
Thus, the language of the Amendment specifically mentioned “Sharia Law” twice. Following 
revisions of the Ballot Question by the Attorney General, the Amendment was put up for 
referendum as State Question 755 to Oklahoma voters on November 2, 2010, and just over 70% 
of voters approved it.
40
  The Attorney General, perhaps ill advisedly as the later discussion on 
Sharia will demonstrate, revised the Ballot Question to state that “Sharia Law is Islamic Law.  It 
is based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teachings of Mohammed.”41  The Tenth 
Circuit noted that “[w]ithout intervention, the proposed amendment would likely have been 
certified on November 9, 2010.”42 
B. The Decision in Awad v. Ziriax 
On November 4, 2010, Muneer Awad, a practicing Muslim and the executive director of 
the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), brought suit in 
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U.S. District Court against the Oklahoma Election Board seeking to enjoin the board from 
certifying the Amendment’s election result.43  Mr. Awad argued that the Amendment violated 
both the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause due to the fact that the Amendment 
explicitly singled out Islam for negative treatment.
44
  The district court issued a temporary 
restraining order on November 9, 2010, and on November 29, a preliminary injunction was 
granted.
45
  The Election Board then appealed the district court’s decision on December 1, 2010. 
The Tenth Circuit considered Mr. Awad’s argument that the Amendment violated the 
Establishment Clause in the context of the standard for granting a preliminary injunction.
46
  It is 
important to note that the court declined to reach Mr. Awad’s Free Exercise Clause claim 
because it found that his “Establishment Clause claim provides sufficient grounds to uphold the 
preliminary injunction[.]”47  The court first set out to determine whether it should apply the 
Lemon test or the Larson test—the two primary Establishment Clause tests—in the context of 
this case. 
The Lemon test will be discussed in-depth in the Part III of this Comment, but for the 
purposes of this case it is sufficient to note “that Lemon applies to ‘laws affording uniform 
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.’”48  Thus, the 
test would seem to apply only in instances where the law at issue does not single out a religion 
for disparate treatment, which would, of course, make it inapposite for application in this case. 
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The Larson test will also be discussed in greater detail below, but the Tenth Circuit noted that 
Larson applies when “a law discriminates among religions,” and a law so doing will “survive 
only if it is ‘closely fitted to the furtherance of any compelling interest asserted.’”49  In other 
words, if a law discriminates against a particular religion, the traditional rubric of strict scrutiny 
commonly used in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis applies. 
The Tenth Circuit held that the Larson test applied in this case and rejected the Election 
Board’s arguments that Larson was not good law in light of the fact that it is rarely used or, in 
the alternative, was not applicable to the facts of this case.
50
  In response to the Election Board’s 
first argument, the court stated that “Larson’s rare use likely reflects that legislatures seldom 
pass laws that make ‘explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious 
organizations’ as contemplated in Larson.”51   As to the second argument, Judge Matheson 
concluded that the Amendment clearly discriminated against Islam.
52
  The Election Board argued 
that the Amendment only named Sharia law as an example and that the law’s primary purpose 
was to ban Oklahoma courts from considering any religious law in their decisions.
53
  Judge 
Matheson, however, pointed to the Amendment’s plain language, which explicitly provided that 
state court judges are forbidden from considering the law of any state that includes Sharia law, 
“but does not prohibit Oklahoma courts from upholding and adhering to laws of other states that 
include the laws of any other religion.”54  The Election Board argued in the alternative that the 
use of the word “culture” in the Amendment was meant to be synonymous with “religion,” and 
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therefore that the amendment sought to ban consideration of all religious laws.
55
  Judge 
Matheson rejected this argument, as well, stating that even if that were the case, the Amendment 
would still purportedly permit judges to consider religious laws or precepts that are part of 
Oklahoma culture.
56
 
Finding that Larson’s strict scrutiny test applied, Judge Matheson then went on to analyze 
the Amendment under the test.
57
  The first prong of the strict scrutiny test requires that the State 
demonstrate a compelling interest.
58
  In order to do so, the government must demonstrate a real, 
identifiable harm that it is seeking to rectify; “overly general statements of abstract principles do 
not satisfy the government’s burden to articulate a compelling interest.”59  Judge Matheson found 
that the government failed to show a compelling interest because it included only one sentence in 
its supplemental brief on the issue, which simply stated that “Oklahoma certainly has a 
compelling interest in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.”60  The court found 
that the government did “not identify any actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to 
solve.”61  Moreover, Judge Matheson held that the government failed to identify any concrete 
example of a case in which an Oklahoma judge applied Sharia or international law, “let alone 
that such applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems in Oklahoma.”62  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the government had not asserted a compelling state interest.
63
  Even though 
the court’s finding on the compelling-interest prong of the test mooted the need to consider 
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whether the law was narrowly tailored (the second prong of the test), Judge Matheson observed 
that, “the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”64 
In the final analysis, it would appear that the Tenth Circuit was correct in affirming the 
district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction.  Judge Matheson’s decision to apply the 
Larson test, rather than the Lemon test, was well reasoned because the language of the “Save Our 
State” Amendment was fatally flawed by its explicitly singling out of Sharia law.  In light of that 
explicit discrimination, the court had no choice but to apply the Larson test. With respect to 
Judge Matheson’s application of strict scrutiny, the analysis seems to be spot on as to whether 
the government asserted a compelling interest.  It is difficult to argue that the single sentence 
included by the government in its brief
65
 is sufficient to state a compelling interest.  In the 
abstract, the government’s interest in setting up the rules of decision for its courts is certainly a 
compelling one,
66
 but the government utterly failed to point to any concrete problem that it was 
seeking to solve.  The government could have, at the very least, pointed to cases in other states’ 
courts or at the federal level that used or considered religious law or the legal precepts of other 
nations in rendering a decision.  Therefore, it seems fairly clear that the statute fails to pass 
constitutional muster under the Larson test. 
III. Supreme Court Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence 
For the purposes of ensuring a full and fair analysis of alternative forms of state statutes 
or constitutional amendments that achieve the same goals that the “Save Our State” Amendment 
seeks to achieve, it is important to flesh out the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
the realm of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.  The alternatives to be 
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proposed in Part V below might implicate on or the other (or both), and each alternative will be 
analyzed within the framework laid out in this Part. 
A. The Establishment Clause 
The Lemon Test, which is the chief test used by the Court when considering statutes that 
provide benefits to religion and religious organizations, was set forth in the 1971 case of Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.
67
   The case involved challenges to statutes in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania that 
provided state aid or benefits to nonpublic schools.
68
  The Rhode Island statute provided salary 
supplementation to nonpublic school teachers that taught secular subjects, while the 
Pennsylvania statute provided for reimbursement of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and other 
materials only for courses related to secular subjects.
69
  
The test set forth by the Lemon Court consists of three separate prongs: (1) the Court 
must consider whether the challenged statute has a secular legislative purpose;
70
 (2) the statute’s 
“principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”;71 and (3) 
“the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” 72  
Accordingly, the Court determined that both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were 
unconstitutional because they violated the third prong of the test—that is, they represented 
“excessive entanglement between government and religion.”73  As to the Rhode Island statute, 
the Court determined that because the government would have to continually oversee the 
operations of subsidized teachers to ensure that those teachers were not injecting their religious 
views into the classroom, there was impermissible entanglement between the government and 
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 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
68
 Id. at 602. 
69
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70
 Id. at 612. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
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these religiously affiliated schools.
74
  In the case of the Pennsylvania statute, the Court similarly 
found that “the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly 
non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between church and state.”75  Moreover, the fact 
that the statute involved direct aid to religiously affiliated schools pointed to a finding of 
excessive entanglement.
76
  
In contrast to the Lemon test, the Larson test, as set forth in Larson v. Valente, applies in 
cases in which a statute discriminates among different religions.
77
  The case involved a 
Minnesota statute that required religious organizations receiving less than fifty percent of total 
contributions from members or related organizations to register with the Minnesota Department 
of Commerce and file a detailed annual disclosure.
78
  All other religious organizations were 
exempt from the reporting and registration requirements.
79
  The Court began its analysis with an 
important observation: “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”80 
From this general principle, the Court ultimately determined that “when [the Court is] 
presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we 
treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.”81  The 
Court did provide a brief discussion of the Lemon test in the context of this case, stating that the 
third prong—excessive entanglement—was most directly implicated in Larson for substantially 
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similar reasons as those presented in Lemon itself.
82
  Ultimately, however, the Court determined 
that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and hence that 
it failed to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny analysis.
83
  The Court found the 
government’s asserted interest in rooting out fraud to be unconvincing.84   
B. The Free Exercise Clause 
While the Court has analyzed cases under the Free Exercise Clause in various contexts, 
this subpart will focus on one particular class of laws: neutral laws of general application. 
Neutral laws of general application are those laws that do not expressly implicate any religion 
and are intended to apply in any setting, regardless of one’s religious views.85  The Court’s Free 
Exercise Clause jurisprudence in the context of neutral laws of general application is somewhat 
muddled, as the description of the cases below will demonstrate. 
One of the leading cases in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, Braunfeld v. Brown,
 
held 
Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law to be constitutionally permissible even though it placed 
additional economic burdens on Orthodox Jewish business owners whose religion required them 
to close their businesses on Saturdays, as well.
86
  These business owners argued that the statute 
violated the Free Exercise Clause because they would be forced to incur significant economic 
losses while adherents to other faiths, such as Christianity, would be given a considerable 
advantage.
87
  The Court noted that the Sunday closing law at issue did “not make unlawful any 
religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as 
applied to the appellants operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more 
                                                          
82
 See id. at 251–54. 
83
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expensive.”88  Moreover, the Court stated that legislatures could not possibly be expected to 
“enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to 
some sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various religions.”89  As a 
result, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing law.90  Accordingly, it is important to 
note that laws that do not necessarily prohibit one from practicing his or her religion will be 
deemed constitutional.  
In another seminal case, Sherbert v. Verner, which seems in direct conflict with the 
holding in Braunfeld, the Court held unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a 
woman who was fired from her job for refusing to work on her day of Sabbath and subsequently 
refused to take other jobs for substantially the same reason.
91
  The Court, in applying a form of 
strict scrutiny, found that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.
92
  Specifically, 
Justice Brennan put forth a balancing test, stating that “governmental actions that substantially 
burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”93  The 
Court did not expressly overrule Braunfeld, even though the dissent argued that “the decision 
necessarily overrules Braunfeld v. Brown.”94 Justice Brennan sought to distinguish the case from 
Braunfeld, noting that the State in that case had “a strong state interest in providing one uniform 
day of rest for all workers[,]” and that it would not have been administratively feasible to exempt 
those whose faith required that Saturday be their day of rest. 
95
  Justice Brennan seemed to take 
issue with the apparent conditioning of employment benefits on one’s religious beliefs, which he 
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held to “effectively [penalize] the free exercise of [appellant’s] constitutional liberties,”96 and 
found that the State’s interest in this case in preventing fraudulent claims for unemployment 
benefits was not sufficiently compelling.
97
  Despite Brennan’s attempt to distinguish Braunfeld, 
however, the ultimate results in these two cases seem difficult to square.  Both cases concerned a 
law generally applicable to all citizens that placed an economic cost on the exercise of one’s 
religion, yet they reached diametrically opposite results. 
In a third case, the Court extended a religious exemption to Amish families allowing 
them to opt out of the state’s compulsory school attendance statute.98  In his opinion for the 
Court, Chief Justice Burger balanced the religious interests of Amish parents in removing their 
children from secular schools against the state’s interest in ensuring that all students attended 
school until age sixteen.
99
  Ultimately, he found that the Amish parents’ interests in directing 
their children’s religious upbringing outweighed the interest of the State in requiring these 
Amish children to attend school for, at most, two additional years.
100
  Chief Justice Burger 
seemed to employ a standard of review akin to strict scrutiny, stating that “when the interests of 
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim . . . more than merely a reasonable relation 
to some purpose within the competency of the State is required to sustain the validity of the 
State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”101   Although the Court acknowledged the 
state’s strong interest in providing for compulsory school attendance, the Court stated that 
because of Amish’s strong showing of the adverse effect of the compulsory attendance law on 
the practice of their religious beliefs, the burden shifted to the State “to show with more 
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particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely 
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.”102  Because the State was unable to do so, the 
Court exempted the Amish from this generally applicable law, while leaving the law intact.
103
 
The result in this case seems to be fairly consistent with that reached in Sherbert and further 
supports the notion that under certain circumstances, a religious group may be granted an 
exemption from a neutral law of general application upon a strong showing of the adverse effects 
of that law on that group’s religious beliefs. 
In a later case, however, the Court declined to extend a religious exemption to an Oregon 
law prohibiting the ingestion of peyote.
104
  In Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs 
for ingesting peyote, and their unemployment compensation applications were subsequently 
denied upon a finding that they were disqualified from receiving benefits because they were fired 
for work-related misconduct.
105
  In his opinion, Justice Scalia distinguished this case from prior 
cases involving neutral laws of general applicability in which the Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause barred their application, reasoning that those cases involved not just the Free 
Exercise Clause, but the violation of some other constitutional right, as well.
106
  Justice Scalia 
found that “[t]he present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim 
unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”107  Moreover, Justice Scalia 
declined to extend the analysis in Sherbert to this case because this case involved conduct 
prohibited by criminal law, and not merely a dispute over employment compensation.
108
  Justice 
Scalia concluded his opinion by arguing against application of the strict scrutiny analysis 
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employed in Sherbert to cases such as this one, where to do so would potentially invalidate a 
wide range of generally applicable laws and enable citizens to avoid criminal laws on the basis of 
their religious beliefs.
109
  Thus, while the Court seemed to distinguish this case from prior Free 
Exercise Clause cases, it would appear that Justice Scalia sought to limit the use of heightened 
scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause cases involving neutral laws of general application. 
One final case—which may be most pertinent to the discussion to follow—involved a 
challenge by practitioners of the Santeria religion to city ordinances seeking to prohibit the ritual 
slaughter of animals.
110
  While the text of these ordinances may have been at least facially 
neutral, Justice Kennedy concluded that their actual purpose and effect was to single out the 
Santeria religion and suppress its religious practice of ritual slaughter.
111
  In light of that finding, 
Justice Kennedy proceeded to apply strict scrutiny and found that the law was not narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
112
  Importantly, this suggests that virtually 
any law, no matter how facially neutral or generally applicable it may appear, will likely be 
fatally flawed if there is evidence that its actual purpose was to single out a particular religious 
group for disparate treatment.  
In sum, while all of the above-mentioned cases involved seemingly neutral laws of 
general application, they reached widely differing results.  Based on the reasoning in these cases, 
it would appear that the determination of constitutionality is largely dependent upon the specific 
facts of each case.  This notion will be important when applying Free Exercise Clause analysis to 
the alternatives forms of legislation to be suggested in Part V below. 
IV. A Background on Sharia Law and the Concept of Parallel Sharia and Their Influence in 
Western Countries 
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A. A Background on Sharia Law 
In its most general sense, Sharia is defined as, “[t]he body of Islamic religious law 
applicable to police, banking, business, contracts, and social issues.”113  At its core, Sharia, 
which means “path” in Arabic, seeks first and foremost to govern “daily routines, familial and 
religious obligations, and financial dealings.”114  In addition, however, Sharia governs a wide 
variety of other behaviors, such as “inheritance, marriage and divorce, other moral issues, 
cleanliness and personal hygiene . . . criminal justice, and war.”115  
In Islamic countries, Sharia has moved along two separate tracks: traditional Sharia and 
Islamist Sharia.  Traditional Sharia is the most-practiced form and is generally viewed as a 
personal guide, “limited to religious observance by Muslims, and elements of family law.”116 
That is, traditional Sharia generally applies “to the personal practice of religious observance, 
family issues, and finance, but not to crime or governance.”117  Thus, in its traditional sense, 
Sharia is relegated to personal religious issues and family issues, but plays no part in the 
administration of the secular government—and nearly every Muslim country (save for Sudan, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia) adheres to this point of view.
118
   
This traditional, or personal, form of Sharia thus mainly concerns the regulation of only 
personal behaviors of Muslims and does not conflict with secular law.  For example, personal 
Sharia governs the products a Muslim may purchase, the foods a Muslim may eat, the beverages 
a Muslim may consume (alcohol is forbidden), and the manner in which a Muslim must pray or 
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dress.
119
  In Western countries, none of these requirements is foisted upon non-Muslims, and 
Muslims themselves voluntarily adhere to the guidelines of Sharia law; as a result, this form of 
Sharia does not pose any meaningful threat to Western legal systems.
120
 
A more hotly contested area of traditional Sharia in which problems have arisen, 
however, is in the area of family law, particularly with respect to the disparate treatment of 
women in such matters.
121
  Adherents of traditional Sharia generally view matters related to 
marriage and sexual relations to be governed by religious law and not by secular law.
122
 In many 
cases, Muslims “may decline Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law . . . from 
turning to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance.”123  Thus, while traditional Sharia 
may vindicate the rights of women after the fact, the poor and unequal treatment of women in 
family matters continues to pervade Muslim societies.
124
  For example, while the practice is 
declining (especially among more affluent Muslims), traditional Sharia has allowed for arranged 
marriages, provided that they are consensual but not clearly stating that the woman has a choice 
in the matter.
125
  In addition, some Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia sanction female 
genital mutilation (FGM), “honor” murders, and forced marriage and divorce.126  In fact, recent 
UN estimates show that “thousands of women are killed annually in the name of family 
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honor.”127  While many Muslim societies have rejected FGM, it is still considered mandatory in 
some Muslim cultures.
128
  Finally, a well-known example to those in Western countries is the 
disparate dress requirements imposed on Muslim men and women. While both men and women 
are expected to be modest, men are not subjected to the same strict body covering requirements 
to which Muslim women must adhere.
129
  These examples demonstrate only some of the ways in 
which there is potential for conflict between Western conceptions of gender equality and Sharia 
family law.
130
  
Generally speaking, while the above discussion demonstrates some tension between 
Western ideals and Islamic law, the relationship between traditional Sharia law and Western law 
has not historically been adversarial in nature.
131
  In fact, Muslim immigrants in Western 
countries adhering to traditional Sharia actively partake in the political process in their new 
countries and reject terrorism in all of its forms.
132
  Moreover, these traditional Sharia adherents 
widely accept Western law, and traditional Sharia actually mandates that Muslims accept and 
abide by the law of the country in which they reside; if they refuse to do so, they are directed to 
leave that country for a Muslim one.
133
  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, traditional Sharia 
does not apply to non-Muslims; for example, non-Muslims in Western countries are not required 
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in any way to adhere to the Muslim ban on consumption of alcohol.
134
  This rule of thumb 
applies in almost every Muslim country, with the exception of Saudi Arabia.
135
  Accordingly, 
any fears among non-Muslims in Western countries that they might be forced to submit to the 
dictates of Sharia law would seem to be largely unfounded.  
The radical Islamist conception of Sharia, however, is the one that generates the greatest 
fear among non-Muslims that the Western legal system could one day be overtaken by Sharia 
principles of law.  For the most part, radical elements of Sharia persist in very few Islamic 
countries, and adherents to radical Sharia make up a tiny minority of the minority Muslim 
populations in Western countries.
136
  As stated previously, however, this Comment seeks to draw 
out some of the reasons why States would even consider adopting a law that would prohibit 
consideration of Sharia in their courts.
137
  Such legislation actually seeks to attack only the most 
radical elements of Sharia and does not seek to undermine in any way traditional Muslim 
practices, and indeed that is the view of at least some moderate Muslims.
138
 
The radical conception of Sharia “holds that the West is an area of unbelief and that 
Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must establish their own Islamic 
legal standard.”139  Adherents of radical Sharia call for far more than simply personal practice of 
the Muslim faith; their stated goal is to create Islamic States governed solely by Sharia law.
140
  
Traditional and radical Sharia depart largely in the area of family law, with the most ominous 
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consequences of that departure falling on women.
141
  While traditional Sharia certainly 
contradicts typical Western views with respect to its treatment of women on certain issues, 
adherents to radical Sharia believe that women should be further subordinated in society.
142
  
Practices in Saudi Arabia serve as the best example of the operation of radical Sharia; the 
government in Saudi Arabia believes “that Shariah forbids women from driving vehicles, 
appearing in public without a full and loose body covering, [or] meeting with male non-relatives 
in the absence of a family member of the woman as chaperone[.]”143  In addition to the poor 
treatment of women that radical Sharia adherents advocate, they have also attempted in some 
cases to impose the dictates of Sharia on non-Muslims—for example, radical Sharia adherents in 
a number of communities in Western countries sought to prohibit non-Muslim neighbors from 
dealing in any business having to do with alcohol or pigs.
144
  Even more frighteningly, some in 
Britain alleged the existence of “no-go zones” for non-Muslims, in which the communities are 
essentially closed Muslim societies hostile towards non-Muslims.
145
 
Radical Sharia further calls on its adherents to abstain from Western political processes 
and states that Western laws against terrorism are not applicable to them.
146
  In addition, radical 
Sharia supporters “indoctrinate Muslims in the belief that adherence to Islamic law exempts 
immigrant Muslims or their offspring from obedience to common and criminal law in Western 
countries,” and advocate that its adherents are to disregard the social and personal 
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responsibilities that they may have with non-Muslims and even with moderate Muslims.
147
 
Radical Sharia adherents also believe that they are justified in behaving in a variety of manners 
that would seem repugnant to Western societies.
148
  Essentially, radical Sharia espouses the view 
that because Sharia law derives from divine sources and secular law does not, “secular law may 
be ignored or violated.”149 
Apart from their view on the invalidity of secular law, adherents to radical Sharia 
advocate for a number of oppressive policies in the area of family law.  For example, some 
supporters of radical Sharia apparently support the execution of homosexuals.
150
  Adherents also 
believe that it is permissible for a husband to beat his wife if the wife becomes rebellious or 
refuses to have sex with him.
151
  In addition, the practice of FGM seems to have broad support 
among radical Sharia adherents, and they believe that the cutting of the woman’s clitoris actually 
serves to dignify or purify women.
152
  Also prevalent in radical Sharia is the concept of 
punishment for “crimes” completely disproportionate to the conduct at issue.  In Saudi Arabia, 
for example, a person found guilty of adultery is subject to as many as 100 lashes.
153
  A person 
caught drinking alcohol earns anywhere from forty to eighty lashes, and in one horrifying case, a 
Saudi man was given 4,750 lashes for having sex with his sister-in-law.
154
  Even more examples 
of excessive punishment for “morals offenses” abound, but just these few examples illustrate the 
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extreme views of society embraced by radical Sharia adherents.  Adherents to traditional Sharia 
have expressed concern that adherents to radical Sharia seek to impose this strict form of law in 
all Muslim countries and even in Muslim communities within Western societies.
155
 
Thus, Muslim thinking is somewhat bifurcated with respect to the nature of Sharia to 
which Muslims should adhere.  While the large majority of Muslims support the traditional, or 
personal, conception of Sharia, radical Sharia adherents still seem to pervade the landscape and 
their prominence in media reporting gives the public the impression that their numbers and 
influence on Muslim discourse are greater than they are in reality.  It is perhaps for this reason 
that many so-called “Islamophobes” accord the imposition of Sharia law in Western countries 
the status of a clear and present danger, even though most empirical data would suggest the 
threat to be far less grave and far more remote in reality.  In addition, the diametrically opposing 
views of traditional and radical Sharia adherents may have led to the creation of a “middle way” 
that is the topic of the next section: Parallel Sharia. 
B. History and Background on Parallel Sharia 
Parallel Sharia is a somewhat middle road between traditional Sharia and radical Sharia 
that was developed in Europe in the 20th century.
156
  Parallel Sharia departs from traditional 
Sharia in that it advocates a separate legal system that Western governments would be charged 
with enforcing.
157
  It differs from the radical conception of Sharia because “it is limited to 
personal and family law as well as, increasingly, financial transactions.”158  While some have 
characterized the concept of parallel Sharia as a compromise between Muslim minorities and 
Western governments, many non-Muslim commentators view it as merely a Trojan horse for the 
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introduction of radical Sharia in their countries.
159
  At first glance, the concept of parallel Sharia 
seems quite benign; it simply asks that Muslims be permitted to live under the laws of their 
religion and requests enforcement assistance from the Western government.  But upon further 
inspection, the concept is rife with radical tinges because it advocates a separatist view of society 
in which a small minority lives under one set of rules while all others live under a different set of 
rules.
160
  Moreover, the concept of parallel Sharia opens the door for radicalization, “since, in a 
Muslim-only legal structure, Muslim representatives of varying orientations could gain 
authority.”161 
While parallel Sharia poses as moderation between traditional and radical Sharia, the 
concept has actually been most strongly advanced in radical circles, with a great deal of scholarly 
contribution to the area originating in the United States.
162
  Euphemistically termed “fiqh for 
minorities”—that is, Islamic legal interpretation for minorities—the concept of parallel Sharia is 
grounded in a false view of the history of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands.
163
  Taha Jabir Al-
Alwani, an Iraqi-born cleric formerly residing in the United States and a leading proponent of 
parallel Sharia, claimed that Muslims dominated the world in antiquity and affluent Muslims 
traveling to non-Muslim lands would regularly set up mini-societies over which Muslim law had 
complete dominion, without any interference from Western authorities.
164
  This view of history 
is not grounded in any reality, but it appears to reinforce the view that Muslims living in non-
Muslim lands should not be obligated to follow the dictates of secular law.
165
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Certainly, the concept of parallel Sharia could merely be accepted as a theory of 
reasonable accommodation of religion, and as such, perfectly acceptable in countries such as the 
United States under current constitutional jurisprudence.
166
  This notion, however, proves too 
simplistic.  The concept of reasonable accommodation has never incorporated the idea that an 
entire religious minority should be outside the purview of all secular law; rather, it merely posits 
that in certain circumstances, the law may bend, but not break, to a reasonable extent to 
accommodate one’s religious preferences.167  Indeed, the idea of reasonable accommodation can 
be seen in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder discussed supra, in which the Supreme Court granted a 
narrow exemption to Amish schoolchildren by allowing them to forgo two extra years of 
mandatory schooling.
168
  Conversely, the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment Division v. 
Smith could be viewed as a judgment that to permit exemption from a generally applicable drug 
law solely because of religious beliefs would be to unreasonably accommodate one’s religion.169  
Parallel Sharia goes far beyond a reasonable accommodation of religion because it advocates a 
separatist viewpoint and would lead to further fracturing of the legal and social ties that bind all 
members of a given society together.
170
  
Nonetheless, advocates of parallel Sharia continue to espouse the view that Western 
acceptance of the idea would actually serve the twin goals of unity among the Muslim population 
and comity between Muslims and non-Muslims.
171
  It seems plain, however, that permitting one 
minority population to live under its own set of rules would have one of two effects: feelings of 
resentment and suspiciousness between Muslims and non-Muslims, and incredulousness and 
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disillusionment with the national government for permitting such a dual system of law to operate 
in a country that seemingly respected the rule of law.  It is perhaps possible that supporters of 
parallel Sharia are aware of the nature of the actual effects of such a system on society, but that 
their goal is to give Sharia law a foothold in Europe and the United States for possibly nefarious 
purposes in the future.
172
  As stated previously, an important aspect of the concept of parallel 
Sharia is the idea that Western governments would be charged with its enforcement.
173
  If a 
Western government such as the United States were indeed to formally adopt such a system, it 
would seem difficult to argue that the system does not violate the precept of separation of church 
and state that most view as a fundamental requirement of modern democratic societies.  
C. Sharia Law in Great Britain 
In light of the shared history and interests of the United States and Great Britain, Great 
Britain’s experience with Sharia law in recent years provides a good opportunity to gain a sense 
of the specific developments occurring in Western countries with respect to Sharia.  Britain is 
currently home to approximately 2.7 million Muslims and 1,500 mosques.
174
  Over the last thirty 
years or so, Britain has become a hotbed of Islamic radicalism in Europe.
175
  In cities with 
significant Muslim populations such as London, Birmingham, and Oldham, radicalism takes the 
form of “jihadist financing and recruitment activity, mainly introduced from Pakistan[.]”176  
Great Britain’s response to the increasing radicalization of Muslim communities is not 
particularly assertive, although the government has acted swiftly and decisively in the face of the 
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most radical elements in society.
177
  The government has sought to improve dialogue through 
interaction with so-called moderates in order to dissuade radicals from violence, but this course 
of action has unfortunately not improved the situation.
178
 
In recent years, the religious and political elite in Great Britain have waded into 
controversial waters with respect to the role of Sharia law in British civil law generally.
179
  In 
2008, for example, the Archbishop of Canterbury urged “acceptance of some (unspecified) 
aspects of Shariah alongside existing civil law in the United Kingdom.”180  Soon thereafter, the 
British equivalent of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court lent credence to the Archbishop’s 
statement by showing support for resolution of business and family disputes via Sharia 
mediation.
181
  The Lord Chief Justice, however, was careful to point out that moral
182
 or criminal 
punishment could not be handed down via any Sharia mediation process.
183
 
This willingness to accept Sharia as a legitimate means for dispute resolution seems to 
have grown out of developments beginning in the 1990s that focused on greater accommodation 
of Islamic business practices, such as the Islamic bar against interest payments on loans.
184
  
While the accommodation of Islamic beliefs in business and finance is hardly a cause for 
concern, these accommodations appear to have emboldened radical Sharia adherents to push for 
even greater concessions in other facets of society such as, for example, the issue of forced 
marriages.
185
  As the last decade wore on, Islamic fundamentalists pushed for the establishment 
of Islamic holidays as national holidays, and it was reported that 40% of British Muslims favored 
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the use of Sharia in Great Britain.
186
 In the aftermath of the statements made by fundamentalists 
and the report, apparently moderate voices of the British Muslim community spoke out, 
including Member of Parliament Shahid Malik, who condemned demands for Sharia and the 
creation of national holidays for Islamic holidays.
187
  Mr. Malik recited the principle of the 
moderate and traditional conception of Sharia that Muslims are to abide by the laws of the 
country in which they live.
188
  Although a great majority of British Muslims continues to hold 
moderate views with respect to the proper place of Sharia in non-secular society, it appears as 
though the loud voices of Islamic fundamentalists have gained a foothold with the younger 
generation of British Muslims, as statistics published in 2007 by Policy Exchange 
demonstrate.
189
 In addition to the Policy Exchange survey, a 2008 YouGov survey of Muslim 
students in Great Britain found that “32 per cent of Muslim students polled said killing in the 
name of religion was justified, compared to 2 per cent of non-Muslims.”190 
In view of the changing attitudes among younger British Muslims, it is important to 
examine the ways in which radical Sharia adherents in Britain seek to influence society. One 
such avenue of influence for radical Sharia advocates has been in the area of family and 
schooling, and these radicals have “call[ed] for Muslim children to be educated only in Islamic 
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schools.”191   At this point, efforts to gather support among the Muslim community for the 
teaching of an Islamic curriculum in state-funded schools has largely failed.
192
  Indeed, of 
376,000 Muslim school-age children, only 1,770 attended state-funded Muslim schools as of 
2007.
193
  The specter of potential radicalization looms, however, even in non-religious state 
schools, as evidenced by the Muslim Council of Britain’s (MCB) 2007 call “to introduce 
‘parallel Shariah’ in state schools” through a plan that sought to limit Muslim students’ exposure 
to the ideas of other religions and impose Muslim dress codes and special accommodations for 
Muslim students.
194
  In addition, “[t]he MCB has sought to introduce anti-evolution, anti-Jewish, 
and general anti-Western literature into British state schools.”195 Notwithstanding the MCB’s 
efforts, however, it must be noted “that Muslim parents in Western Europe continue to mainly 
seek education for their children in non-Muslim state schools.”196 But the fact remains that 
organizations in Great Britain such as the MCB continue to push their radical agenda, and their 
voices continue to be heard.  
One of the most important undertakings of radical Sharia adherents in Great Britain is 
their effort to introduce the concept of parallel Sharia, discussed previously.
197
  While there 
already exist entirely unproblematic Islamic tribunals to adjudicate mostly matters related to 
marriage and divorce, advocates of radical Sharia seek “official state enforcement of religious 
decrees” to which all Muslims, whether they want to or not, are obligated to adhere.198  Of 
course, if two parties to a dispute agree to have the matter heard before a religious arbitration 
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tribunal, there is no problem in seeking enforcement of any judgment rendered by such a tribunal 
in a court of law.
199
  A problem would arise, however, if such tribunals were able to gain 
jurisdiction over a dispute in the absence of an agreement between the parties to have the matter 
so adjudicated, since arbitration is fundamentally rooted in contract law.
200
  This type of 
obligatory submission to religious adjudication of disputes is exactly the type of system that 
radical Sharia adherents in Britain seek, even though a decisive majority of British Muslims 
oppose such a system and fear backlash as a result of these radicals’ calls for such a system.201 In 
addition to pushback from the Muslim population at large, the British Muslim legal community 
is strongly opposed to the introduction of obligatory Sharia law enforced and administered by the 
state.
202
  Therefore, while it is certainly troubling that there exist influential groups in Great 
Britain pushing for a parallel system of Sharia, the strong opposition to the implementation of 
such a system among British Muslims should prove to be a strong safeguard in the years to 
come.  
The majority of Muslims living in Western countries seem to live their lives in much the 
same manner as adherents of other faiths—they seek to follow the moral and ethical obligations 
imposed on them by their religion while complying with the obligations that secular law 
imposes.
203
  Unfortunately, however, a minority of radical Muslims in Western countries—
through louder and more widely reported protestations—have caused considerable consternation 
and stoked fear that the majority of Muslims seek to live under their own system of law based on 
the Islamic faith.  As this Part demonstrates, this notion could not be further from the truth.  This 
                                                          
199
 Id. 
200
 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2011). 
201
 A GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW, supra note 9, at 40. 
202
 Id. at 41. 
203
 See Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Duties of Muslims Living in the West, QURANFORALL.ORG, 
http://www.quranforall.org/fatawaa/duties.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).  
 34 
is not to say that Islamic radicalism in Western countries is not a cause for concern, however.  
Fears of increasing influence of Muslim radicals are perfectly legitimate, and Western 
governments should not hesitate to take steps to safeguard against further radicalization in the 
future.  Whether stemming the tide of increasing radicalization is achieved through appropriate 
legislation, better education of both Muslims and non-Muslims on the virtues of a secular 
government separate from religion,
204
 through better and more frequent reporting on the views of 
everyday mainstream Muslims, or through a combination of those initiatives, this issue is a 
challenge that Western countries must address in order to preserve their respective systems of 
government and quell the divisiveness that religious issues such as this one so often foment. 
Dismissing the concerns that many harbor with respect to Islamic radicalism as “Islamophobia” 
is a simplistic view that ignores the real and identifiable harm that could result from acquiescing 
to the demands of a radical few while turning a blind eye to the silent majority of Muslims in 
Western countries who simply seek the same things that all other citizens seek from their 
governments: unbiased and just application of the secular laws and freedom to practice their 
religion as they see fit. 
V. Principles of Federalism and Alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment 
The concept of “Our Federalism” has been an important one since the founding of this 
country.  Put simply, “Our Federalism” is a “recognition of the fact that the entire country is 
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the 
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform 
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their separate functions in their separate ways.”205  The Founding Fathers were sensitive to the 
notion that State governments should be free to carry out their legitimate functions without 
undue interference from the federal government, and this notion still “occupies a highly 
important place in our Nation’s history and its future.”206  The concept of “Our Federalism” is 
perhaps most definitively embodied in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which states 
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 207   Thus, while the 
Constitution prescribes the outer bounds of the function of the federal government, it leaves to 
the States any powers not specifically delegated to the federal government. 
Among the powers left to the states is the power to shape their respective judiciaries. 
Indeed, the broad power of the states to establish the nature, function, and rules of their courts 
has long been recognized.
208
  While Article III of the United States Constitution and Marbury v. 
Madison place constraints on the ability of the Congress to shape the judiciary and its rules of 
decision (since the judiciary, and in particular the Supreme Court, is the final expositor of the 
law),
 209
 no such constraints exist at the State level except for those imposed by State 
constitutions or statutes. States are free to direct the rules of decision of their courts without 
federal interference, whether through legislation (to the extent possible under the State 
constitution), judicial action, or through the State constitutional amendment process.
210
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It is against this backdrop of federalism that this Comment offers potential alternatives to 
the “Save Our State” Amendment.  At their core, state constitutional amendments or statutes like 
the “Save Our State” Amendment are merely rules of judicial procedure because they seek to 
provide the state courts with guidance as to the law on which decisions should be based.
211
  As 
such, the States should be free to amend their state constitutions or enact legislation to force their 
judiciaries to adhere to particular rules of decision, so long as those amendments or statutes 
comport with the principles embodied in, and the individual rights secured by, the federal 
Constitution.
212
  While it may be the case that the “Save Our State” Amendment was fatally 
flawed in its blatant discrimination, there is no reason why similar state constitutional 
amendments or statutes seeking to achieve the same goal of separation of church and state could 
not pass muster under First Amendment analysis. 
A. The First Alternative to the “Save Our State” Amendment: An Amendment or 
Statute That Avoids Mention of Religion Entirely 
 
In searching for constitutionally permissible alternatives to the “Save Our State” 
Amendment, the most obvious starting point would be a state constitutional amendment or 
statute that avoids the discriminatory singling out of a particular religion that proved to be the 
fatal flaw in the “Save Our State” Amendment under the Supreme Court’s Larson Test.213  That 
is, this type of state constitutional amendment would essentially mirror the “Save Our State” 
Amendment, with the references to Sharia stricken.  Recall the language of the “Save Our State” 
Amendment: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.” (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 
U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting))). 
211
 See H.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (requiring, among other things, Oklahoma courts to 
base decisions on federal and state law and regulations).  
212
 See Lewis, 101 U.S. at 30.  
213
 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (holding that laws discriminating among religion will be 
analyzed under the rubric of strict scrutiny); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129-31 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
the “Save Our State” Amendment failed to satisfy Larson’s strict scrutiny test). 
 37 
The Courts . . . shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States 
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma 
Statutes and rules promulgated thereto, and if necessary the law of another of the 
United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in 
making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or 
Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the 
respective courts, including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.
214
 
 
Thus, the type of state constitutional amendment proposed here would simply strike the italicized 
language above. Arizona passed a statute in 2011 with language similar to that proposed here in 
that it simply prohibited enforcement of foreign laws conflicting with the Constitution, laws, and 
treaties of the United States or with the constitution and laws of Arizona.
215
  As of the time of 
this writing, Arizona’s law is the only one with a similar aim as that of the “Save Our State” 
Amendment to achieve passage, and it has yet to be challenged in court as unconstitutional.
216
  In 
light of those facts, the Arizona law would be a strong model for the drafting of a statute that 
enshrines the supremacy of domestic law while avoiding the unconstitutionally discriminatory 
pitfalls of the “Save Our State” Amendment.  In assessing the effectiveness and constitutionality 
of a statute like Arizona’s, the questions to be decided will be twofold: first, whether the 
resulting language would achieve the goals of strict adherence to federal and state law and 
separation of church and state that the original amendment sought; and second, whether the 
resulting language would raise any other constitutional problems. 
As to the first question, while the amendment would clearly not have the same explicit 
effect as intended under the original, this revised amendment would certainly still enshrine the 
concept of the supremacy of state and federal law in state courthouses.  How necessary such an 
amendment would be in light of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the 
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plenary police powers of the state under the Tenth Amendment is not a question that need be 
decided here; it is sufficient to state that there is no constitutional bar to codification of common 
law principles, and in fact, state legislatures across the country routinely engage in the practice of 
codification of judge-made law.
217
  It must be noted, however, that while a law like Arizona’s 
would certainly avoid the problem of discrimination seen in the “Save Our State” Amendment, 
avoidance of that problem would come at the expense of the goal of explicitly codifying a ban on 
consideration of religious doctrine in judicial decision-making.
218
 
The more difficult question would be whether a constitutionally impermissible purpose in 
the context of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment could still be gleaned from a statute 
similar to Arizona’s, even though the statute contains no explicit mention of religion.  The 
relevant language of the Arizona statute defines foreign law as “any law, rule or legal code or 
system other than the Constitution, laws, and ratified treaties of the United States and the 
territories of the United States, or the constitution and laws of this State.”219  Thus, the word 
“religion” appears nowhere in the statute; broadly interpreted, however, the “any law, rule or 
legal code or system” language could be construed to include religious doctrine.  Of course, 
religious doctrines could be considered “systems” and religion does play an important part in a 
variety of legal systems across the globe, but it would be a tremendous leap to say that because 
the amendment mentions the word “system,” it automatically has some discriminatory purpose 
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against organized religion.  Interpreted in a way that avoids the implication of religion, this 
language could mean merely that a state court is prohibited from using, as principal justification 
for its decision in a given case, law deriving from another country or culture. That is, the statute 
ostensibly permits consideration of laws deriving from another country or culture as persuasive, 
so long as those laws do not control the decision of the court. Assuming for the sake of 
argument, however, that the language of the statute does imply a ban on consideration of 
religious doctrine, analysis under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment becomes appropriate.  
As an initial matter, it seems clear that the Larson Test would not apply in this context 
because we are not “presented with a state law granting a denominational preference”;220 indeed, 
the plain language of the proposed statute never mentions religion and thus could not possibly be 
construed to single out any specific religion.  Thus, the more appropriate test under the 
Establishment Clause for the purposes of the proposed statute would be the three-pronged Lemon 
Test, which requires that (1) the statute have a secular legislative purpose;
221
 (2) the statute’s 
“principal or primary effect . . . neither advances nor inhibits religion”;222 and (3) “the statute 
[does] not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”223  
The proposed statute would meet the first prong of the test because its secular purpose 
ostensibly would be to protect citizens of a given state from the application of laws inconsistent 
with federal or state law.  As a point of reference, the Arizona legislature itself declared that its 
intent in passing its statute was “to protect its citizens from the application of foreign laws when 
the application of a foreign law will result in the violation of a right guaranteed by the 
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constitution of this state or of the United States or conflict with the laws of this State.”224  As to 
the second prong, the statute’s principal or primary effect would simply be to force state judges 
to base their decisions on federal or state law and preclude application of foreign laws.  Any 
effect that the law might have on religion could hardly be considered primary or principal.  Thus, 
the proposed statute would pass the second prong of the test.  Finally, the proposed statute would 
meet the third prong of the test because it would not require constant policing of interactions 
between the state judiciary and religion.  Most of the policing and oversight of the state judiciary 
would be with respect to its general use of foreign law in its decision, with cases involving 
religious doctrine possibly comprising a small subset of cases within that larger class.  Therefore, 
because the proposed statute would contravene neither the Larson Test nor the Lemon Test, the 
statute would likely be constitutional under Establishment Clause Analysis.  
In analyzing the proposed statute in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, probably the 
most appropriate point of departure for the analysis is the case of Braunfeld v. Brown, in which 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s generally applicable Sunday 
closing law even though it placed business owners observing a Saturday Sabbath at a decided 
disadvantage in relation to Sunday Sabbath observers.
225
  The aim of the statute proposed here is 
generally to ensure that state court judges do not base their decisions on foreign law that is 
inconsistent with state or federal law.  As such, the statute at most “imposes only an indirect 
burden on the exercise of religion”226 and does not specifically outlaw any religious practice.  
Moreover, the proposed statute is only meant to apply to the state judiciary (a branch of 
government) and not to citizens generally, so it is difficult to see how the government could 
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impose any substantial indirect burden on the citizenry’s ability to live their lives in accordance 
with their respective faiths.  Of course, the statute would indirectly affect citizens, since the cases 
that they bring in state court must necessarily be adjudicated in accordance with the statute, thus 
leaving open the possibility that their rights under the Free Exercise Clause are implicated in a 
given case involving religion.  That problem would be ameliorated, however, by the proposed 
statute’s requirement that state judges’ decisions be made in accordance with the United States 
Constitution.  That language would presumably be meant to include not just the text of the 
Constitution itself, but also the meaning of the Constitution as determined by the Supreme Court. 
Therefore, the proposed statute would not appear to endanger the citizens’ free exercise rights, 
and the statute would consequently pass constitutional muster under Free Exercise Clause 
analysis as a neutral law of general applicability. 
B. Another Alternative: Broad Banning of Consideration of Religious Law as 
Controlling Authority in a Given Case 
 
A second type of state constitutional amendment or statute would be one that broadly 
bans consideration of any religious doctrine or international law, but with more precise and 
narrowing language than the “Save Our State” Amendment’s command that state courts “shall 
not consider international law or Sharia law.”  That is, the amendment or statute could broadly 
ban state judges from relying chiefly upon foreign or religious law as a basis for their decisions. 
Again, a proposed (but not passed) Arizona statute provides a strong model for this type of 
legislation.
227
  The proposed Arizona bill, known as the “Arizona Foreign Decisions Act”, begins 
by forbidding the Arizona courts from incorporating “any body of religious sectarian law into 
any decision, finding or opinion as controlling or influential authority.”228  The bill goes on to 
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define religious sectarian law has “any statute, tenet or body of law evolving within and binding 
a specific religious sect or tribe,” including “Sharia law, Canon law, Halacha and Karma.”229  
Thus, the proposed statute avoids the discriminatory pitfalls of the “Save Our State” 
Amendment by providing for a blanket ban of consideration of any religious law in state court; 
the fact that the statute specifically mentions as examples all of the most prominent religious 
doctrines implies the statute’s intention to ban consideration of any religious law. Moreover, the 
reach of the law is narrowed in that it limits the ban only to situations in which the reasoning in a 
court’s decision relies primarily upon religious law.  As such, this type of statute would 
ostensibly avoid the potential injury raised by Mr. Awad in Awad v. Ziriax, in which he claimed 
that the “Save Our State” Amendment would prohibit a court from properly probating his will.230  
Because probate of one’s will in accordance with that individual’s wishes would not be chiefly 
reliant upon religious law (one’s religious beliefs might underlie the directions contained within 
the will, but that would not be an issue for the court to decide), but rather upon state probate 
statutes, such a judicial proceeding would not be likely to fall within the ambit of the proposed 
statute.  This proposed statute seemingly provides a more robust alternative to the first statute 
proposed in terms of its explicit language regarding religion, but the question becomes whether 
this explicit ban runs afoul of the Religion Clauses. 
As with the first proposed statute, Establishment Clause analysis under the Larson Test 
would seem to be inapposite here, since the proposed statute does not single out any one religion 
for disparate treatment, but rather treats all religions in the exact same manner.  Thus, analysis 
under the Lemon Test will be more appropriate in this case.  As to the first prong of the Test,
231
 
the purpose of the proposed statute is certainly secular in nature, since the chief aim of the 
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proposed statute is to ensure that religious law does not infect the state courts.  That is, the 
statute’s goal is to affirm and enshrine the separation of church and state. While the statute 
would seem to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon Test, however, difficulties may arise in 
satisfying the second and third prongs of the test.
232
  As to the second prong, the question is 
whether the proposed statute would have the principal or primary effect of inhibiting religion.  
Given that courts are already generally forbidden to interpret religious law,
233
 it is difficult to see 
how a statute that simply reinforces that notion by forbidding the use of religious law as 
controlling authority for a judicial decision would inhibit religion in any way.  Religious practice 
would not be inhibited simply because courts are forbidden from entertaining arguments 
emanating out of a religious doctrine, and in fact a law such as the one proposed would have the 
effect of leveling the playing field for all religions by ensuring that judicial decisions will not 
favor one religion over another.
234
  Thus, the proposed statute meets the second prong of the 
Lemon Test.  Finally, the third prong of the Lemon Test requiring that the statute not cause 
excessive entanglement between government and religion
235
 presents a closer question.  The 
proposed statute, however, is distinguishable from a statute involving, for example, interaction 
between government and religious organizations because this statute merely amounts to a state 
court procedural rule and thus will not require any monitoring of interactions between any 
apparatus of the government and religious institutions.  Rather, the statute would simply require 
monitoring of the behavior of state judges to ensure that they are not injecting religious law into 
their decisions.  While one could argue that this monitoring could amount an entanglement 
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between government and religion in the abstract, it could hardly be said to be a concrete 
entanglement of religious and governmental interests.  For that reason, the proposed statute 
should satisfy the third prong of the Lemon Test. 
Analysis under the Free Exercise Clause might raise constitutional difficulties in the 
context of this statute, since it does not neatly fit into the category of a neutral law of general 
application.  In one sense, the proposed law is not neutral because it explicitly discusses religion.  
Thus, as between religion and irreligion, the law is not neutral.  In another sense, however, the 
law is arguably neutral because it treats all religions in the same manner.  Neutrality, therefore, is 
in the eye of the beholder.  Accepting for the sake of argument that the law is, in fact, neutral, the 
most appropriate Supreme Court case on which to base analysis of the proposed statute under the 
Free Exercise Clause would likely be Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
in which the Supreme Court held a seemingly neutral statute to be unconstitutional because it 
prohibited a practice of ritual slaughter that could be traced to a specific religion.
236
  The 
question, then, is whether the proposed statute could be construed as having an underlying 
discriminatory purpose that is not revealed by its plain language.   As an initial matter, the 
proposed statute here is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Lukumi because while that 
statute sought to outlaw a specific practice of private citizens, this proposed statute simply seeks 
to regulate the conduct of the state judiciary in issuing decisions.  Therefore, there is no pattern 
of conduct attributable to a specific religious group that could be identified here; rather, the 
proposed statute functions more as a prophylactic measure to prevent judges from injecting 
religious doctrine into their opinions.  Moreover, in order to show an underlying discriminatory 
purpose against a certain religion, one would have to demonstrate that this statute is attacking 
known conduct of a particular religious group, and one would be hard-pressed to find evidence 
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of this kind.  The legislative findings appended to the proposed Arizona bill provides significant 
insight into the thinking of state legislators in possibly passing such a statute; those findings are 
replete with references to the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, along with several other 
provisions of the federal Constitution.
237
  Based on the legislative findings, it would seem that 
the overall purpose of the law would be to prevent the establishment of law on the basis of 
religious sectarian law, with no particular view towards outlawing the practice of any specific 
religion.  Indeed, the plain language of the statute specifically identifies and outlaws judicial 
reliance on the laws of any of the major world religions while ensuring that the list of examples 
provided is not exhaustive.
238
  For all of these reasons, the proposed statute would not be 
violative of the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore the law would likely be deemed 
constitutional in the context of the First Amendment. 
VI. Conclusion 
In recent years, the concept of parallel Sharia has gained steam in Western countries as 
the voices of more radical Sharia adherents have grown louder.  While these radical views in no 
way represent the views of the majority of Muslims living in Western countries, they are views 
that have the support of more than just a few on the margins.  In light of this, several states, 
including Oklahoma, have attempted through legislation to prevent ideas such as parallel Sharia 
from gaining a foothold in their governments and thereby undermining the time-honored concept 
of separation of church and state.  While an initiative like the “Save Our State” Amendment 
offends both constitutional principles and general notions of fairness and justice, there should be 
no reason why states cannot take other steps to ensure that their judges apply only secular, 
domestic law.  The Court has long recognized the states’ broad power to develop their respective 
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judiciaries, and if state legislatures view it of sufficient importance to pass laws enshrining the 
supremacy of federal and state law in judicial decisions, then they should be permitted to do so. 
As this Comment demonstrates, the states have alternatives to the “Save Our State” Amendment 
that do not suffer from the same unconstitutionally discriminatory infirmity and achieve 
essentially the same goal.  This issue is certainly a thorny one and the debate will continue to 
rage on as to whether laws similar to the “Save Our State” Amendment are even necessary or 
advisable, but the States’ power to pass non-discriminatory laws that seek to keep religion out of 
their courts should not be up for debate.  
 
